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LBJ's Ghost: A Contextual Approach to Targeting 
Decisions and the Commander in Chief 
J arnes E. Baker • 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The moral imperative and relevance of the Law of Armed Conflict 
("LOAC") is more apparent today than before September 11, 2001. Law 
distinguishes democratic societies from the terrorists who attack them; nowhere 
is this more apparent than in the methods and means of warfare. Indeed, part of 
our revulsion and contempt for terrorism lies in the terrorists' indiscriminate, 
disproportionate, and unnecessary violence against civilians. In contrast, the 
enduring strength of the LOAC is its reliance on the principles of 
proportionality, necessity, and discrimination, which protect civilians and 
minimize combatant suffering. For these reasons, we should not begrudge the 
LOAC's limitations but continue to find the best contextual process for its 
meaningful application. In war, and no more so than in a war against terrorism 
where the terrorists' choice of weapons and targets may be unlimited, this means 
a process that is both militarily effective and legally sound. This Article is about 
the role of the President, and the President's legal counsel, in US targeting 
decisions and in applying the LOAC.1 
Section II begins with three foundational judgments regarding the LOAC. 
First, the LOAC is hard law; that is, it is identifiable and subject to effective 
Judge Baker sits on the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces. He previously 
served as Special Assistant to the President and Legal Adviser to the National Security 
Council (1997-2000) and as Deputy Legal Adviser to the NSC (1994-1997). Judge Baker has 
also served as a Marine Corps infantry officer and as a career attorney in the Office of the 
Legal Adviser, Department of State. Michael Reisman and Robert Kimball read earlier drafts 
of this article and made helpful and thoughtful comments. The views expressed herein are 
those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the US Government or any 
organization within the US Government. 
While the "law of armed conflict" and "law of war" are used interchangeably by a majority of 
commentators, I prefer the law of armed conflict as descriptive nomenclature. Although 
burdensome as a prosaic term, the law of armed conflict more readily reflects the application 
of this body of law to "combat," and not just to what participants in domestic debates over 
the war power will recognize as an elusive subcategory of hostilities known as "war." 
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sanction in US criminal law and in international law. Second, the LOAC is 
realistic law that relies on contextual principles adaptable to changing 
circumstances. Third, the LOAC is good policy and usually consistent with 
military effectiveness. In many contexts there are good policy reasons to restrict 
the manner in which a target is attacked that go beyond limitations required by 
the LOAC. As a result, a process of target decision entails the exercise of policy 
discretion as well as legal judgment and military command. 
In constitutional design and practice, the President is given extraordinary 
authority over the methods and means of warfare. He is also constitutionally 
responsible for upholding the law. Because of prudential considerations 
involving the nature of combat and the necessity for secrecy and speed in 
military command, there is little opportunity, and often less desire, for civilian 
input into targeting decisions outside the military chain of command. Therefore, 
the President and the Secretary of Defense, as the senior members (and only 
civilians) within the chain of command, bear special responsibility to apply and 
oversee the application of the LOAC. This responsibility is reinforced by the 
separation of powers doctrine and correlated exercise of deference by the 
Congress to the President when he is acting as Commander in Chief, and by the 
judiciary under the non-justiciability doctrine. In short, it is with the President 
that law, policy, military command, and democratic legitimacy merge. 
In light of the President's military and LOAC responsibilities, Section III 
of this Article emphasizes a contextual process for the exercise of presidential 
targeting decision. By contextual, I mean a process that is flexible to factual 
circumstance and need, but not to the application of law. By targeting, I mean 
presidential decisions regarding the focal application of coercion by forces in the 
air, on the ground, and at sea. The Article identifies legal, policy, and military 
factors that should determine when a target should be approved by the 
President, as a matter of law and as a matter of policy. These same factors 
should determine whether approval comes on a target-by-target basis, by 
category of target, by application of Rules of Engagement ("ROE"), or through 
general direction, known in military doctrine as the commander's intent. 
Presidential style will also appropriately influence presidential process. 
Perceptions of past presidential performance, however, in particular that of 
President Johnson during the Vietnam War,2 should not determine the degree of 
presidential involvement today; current legal, policy, and military context should. 
Lawyers may not like to admit it, but law, even in a constitutional 
democracy, will only sustain the capacity to guide if it is timely and realistic in 
application. Therefore, this Article concludes in Section IV by describing the 
role of the presidential lawyer and principles of practice that should facilitate the 
See Larry L. King, LBJ and Vietnam, in A Sense of History: The Best [/l"ritingfrom the Pages of 
American Heritage 788-802 (American Heritage 1985). 
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timely and meaningful application of law. For the presidential practitioner there 
is no primer on this subject. Military after-action reports and doctrine are, 
appropriately, written from the standpoint of military process and doctrine, not 
necessarily with presidential counsel in mind. I hope this Article and this 
symposium will serve as a useful point of departure for the consideration of 
presidential process in the future. 
II. FOUNDATIONAL ARGUMENTS 
Consideration of the President's role in wartime, and that of his legal 
counsel, should start with some foundational judgments about the LOAC. These 
judgments demonstrate the relationship among law, policy, and national values 
in applying the law, and therefore, the President's singular responsibility with 
respect to the LOAC. 
A. THE LOAC IS OPERATIONAL LAW 
Cicero may have said that laws are inoperative in war ("Silent enim leges inter 
armd');3 however, in contrast to some areas of international law that are "soft" in 
application, the law regarding the methods and means of warfare is "hard" 
operational law. It is reflected in international treaty text,4 customary 
international law, and US domestic criminal statutes. It is also subject to 
effective United States sanction, and on a more episodic basis, international 
sanction. Adherence to the LOAC is also long-standing United States policy, 
regardless of military context.5 
Title 18 of the US Code establishes US criminal jurisdiction over war 
crimes committed by or against members of the US armed forces or US 
nationals. War crimes are defined as any conduct: 
(1) defined as a grave breach in any of the international conventions 
signed at Geneva 12 August 1949, or any protocol to such 
convention to which the United States is a party; 
"The laws are silent amidst the clash of arms." Cicero, Pro Milone 4 (Oxford 2d ed 1956) (A. 
B. Paynton, ed). 
See, for example, Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land 
(1907), 36 Stat 2277 (hereinafter Hague Convention IV); Convention for the Amelioration of 
the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (1949), 6 UST 3114 
(1950) (hereinafter Geneva Convention I); Convention for the Amelioration of the 
Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea (1949), 
6 UST 3316 (1950) (hereinafter Geneva Convention II); Convention Relative to the 
Treatment of Prisoners of War (1949), 6 UST 3316 (1950) (hereinafter Geneva Convention 
III); Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (1949), 6 UST 
3516 (1950) (hereinafter Geneva Convention IV). 
DoD Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations (Sept 10, 2001); DoD Law of War 
Program, Department of Defense Directive 5100.77 (Dec 9, 1998). 
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(2) prohibited by Article 23, 25, 27, or 28 of the Annex to the Hague 
Convention IV, Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on 
Land, signed 18October1907; 
(3) which constitutes a violation of common Article 3 of the 
international conventions signed at Geneva, 12 August 1949, or any 
protocol to such convention to which the United States is a party 
and which deals with non-international armed conflict; or 
(4) of a person who, in relation to an armed conflict and contrary to 
the provisions of the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on 
the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices as amended at 
Geneva on 3 May 1996 (Protocol II as amended on 3 May 1996), 
when the United States is a par~ to such Protocol, willfully kills or 
causes serious injury to civilians. 
Because 18 USC § 2441 's substantive prohibitions derive meaning through 
cross-reference to the Geneva Conventions, among other international norms, 
US criminal law and international law are ineluctably tied. 
United States jurisdiction to enforce the LOAC is also found in the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice ("UCMJ").7 Article 18 of the UCMJ includes 
within the jurisdiction of general courts-martial "jurisdiction to try any person 
who by the law of war is subject to trial by a military tribunal."8 Jurisdiction to 
punish violations of the LOAC is also exercised through application of the 
punitive articles of the UCMJ, as in the case of William Calley, who was 
convicted after the My Lai massacre of 22 counts of murder under Article 118 of 
the UCMJ.9 In addition, Article 21 contemplates the establishment of other 
jurisdictional vehicles historically used to address violations of the LOAC.10 
Article 21 states: 
The provisions of this chapter conferring jurisdiction upon courts-
martial do not deprive military commissions, provost courts, or other 
military tribunals of concurrent jurisdiction with respect to offenders or 
offenses that by statute or by the law of war may be tried by military 
commissions, provost courts, or other military tribunals. 11 
Congress, of course, may provide additional means of sanction using its 
authority under Article I of the Constitution to "constitute Tribunals inferior to 
the supreme Court . . . define and punish . . . Offences against the Law of 
Nations," and to "make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land 
and naval Forces."12 
IO 
II 
12 
18 USC§ 2441(c) (2000). 
Uniform Code of Military Justice art 2, 10 USC§ 802 (2000) (hereinafter UCMJ). 
UCMJ art 18, 10 USC§ 818 (2000). 
United States v Calley, 22 CMR 534 (1973). 
UCMJ art 21, 10 USC§ 821 (2002); see In re Yamashita, 327 US 1 (1946). 
10 USC§ 821 (2000). 
US Const art I, § 8, els 9-10, 14. This list is illustrative and not necessarily exhaustive. It is 
intended to demonstrate that the LOAC is subject to effective sanction in US law. This 
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The LOAC is also subject to international enforcement and sanction 
through foreign courts, ad hoc tribunals and, potentially, the International 
Criminal Court. Significantly, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslav Republic ("ICTY") demonstrated the universal reach of the law by 
examining NATO's operations as well as those of Serbia during the Kosovo air 
conflict.13 Moreover, the Special Court for Sierra Leone has recently moved 
from creation to indictment in less than one year.14 In doing so, the Chief 
Prosecutor has argued that such ad hoc mechanisms can be timely, cost 
effective, and precise in the exercise of jurisdiction.15 
In summary, the LOAC is operational law subject to effective sanction. As 
a result, the President as Commander in Chief not only has a duty to wage war 
effectively in the interest of US national security, but to do so, under the LOAC, 
in a manner that "take[s] Care that the Laws be faithfully executed."16 
B. THE LOAC IS GOOD POLICY 
Good faith application of the LOAC is also good policy. Adherence to the 
law improves the prospects of, but of course does not guarantee, reciprocal 
application of the same principles by one's opponent. More broadly, the moral 
authority of the United States to espouse the rule of law is founded in part on its 
consistent and faithful adherence to the law. 
Adherence to the law helps to garner and then maintain international 
support (governmental, elite, and public) for US military operations. This is 
particularly the case with respect to democracies. In the case of the 1999 NATO 
air campaign against Serbia, application of the law was a sine qua non for the 
NATO political consensus necessary to authorize NATO military operations.17 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
Article does not express a view on, nor address, the applicability of the LOAC to persons 
detained in the course of the war on terrorism. Nor does it seek to identify or validate all 
potential sources of war crimes jurisdiction nor address the substantive and procedural rules 
that might apply in a particular jurisdictional circumstance. 
James E. Baker, When Lanyers Advise Presidents in Wartime: Kosovo and the Law ef Anned Conflict, 
55 Naval War Coll Rev 11, 21 (Winter 2002). 
See Special Court for Sierra Leone, Office of the Prosecutor, Press Release: Statement f?y David 
Crang (March 10, 2003), available online at <http:/ /www.sc-sl.org> (click "Press and Public 
Affairs" and then "Press Releases," then scroll down to March 10 release) (visited Oct 13, 
2003) (reiterating the first indictments from the Special Court for Sierra Leone). 
David M. Crane, Promoting Accountability and J 11stice in S ie!Ta Leone, Remarks at the 2003 Judicial 
Conference of the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces 2-9 (May 13, 2003) 
(on file with CJIL) (explaining the efficiency and cost-effectiveness of the court). The Special 
Prosecutor has also demonstrated that in the Sierra Leone context, such a judicial mechanism 
can work in a complementary way with a Truth and Reconciliation Commission, also 
intended through a different means to bring justice and healing to a war-torn land. Id at 15-
16. 
US Const art II, § 3. 
Baker, 55 Naval War Coll Rev at 16 (cited in note 13). 
Fa/12003 411 
Chicago Journal of International Law 
Adherence to the LOAC is also essential to sustaining US public support 
for American conflict, not necessarily out of a societal sense of legal obligation 
but out of societal belief in the values of discrimination (distinguishing between 
civilians and combatants) and necessity, which are embodied in the LOAC.18 In 
corollary fashion, actual and perceived US violations of the LOAC erode public 
support for conflict and may overshadow or undermine the purpose and 
legitimacy of particular operations. Indeed, real and perceived violations of the 
law by opponents have helped to cement and sustain public and military support 
for conflicts, as illustrated by the impact of the "Rape of Nanking," Saddam 
Hussein's use of human shields during the First Gulf War, and Iraq's 
mistreatment of POWs in both GulfWars.19 
The LOAC is also generally consistent with military effectiveness. For 
example, the use of ordnance against civilians is hardly economical and it is likely 
to reinforce an adversary's anger and willingness to sacrifice and persist in the 
fight. Put more directly, indiscriminate or disproportionate use of force may 
have short-term military advantage, for example, in clearing a village or 
conducting an urban "reconnaissance by fire." But in the long run, excessive or 
indiscriminate force does not generally break the enemy's will to resist and 
ultimately can demean and degrade military discipline and professionalism. 
Indeed, indiscriminate bombing during World War II, for all sides, appears to 
have strengthened civilian resolve.20 Moreover, unlawful force makes the 
transition to peace operations more difficult because of the civilian hostility that 
remains. Commitment to the ideals embodied in the law in both rhetoric and 
18 
19 
20 
For illustrative definitions and discussion of these terms, as well as proportionality and 
military objective, see for example, W. Hays Parks, Air War and the Law of War, 32 AF L Rev 
1 (1990); William J. Fenwick, The Rule of Proportionality and Protocol I in Conventional Warfare, 98 
Milit L Rev 91 (1982). See also Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions (1949), and 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art 48-58 (1977), 16 
ILM 1391 (1978) (hereinafter Additional Protocol I); "The Law of Targeting," Annotated 
S11pplement to the Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations ch 8 (Oceans Law and 
Policy Department 1997). Capt. Jeanne M. Meyer and Cdr. Brian J. Bill, eds, Operational La1v 
Handbook 2002 ch 2 (Center for Military Law and Operations and International Law 
Division, The Judge Advocate General's School, US Army 2002). 
See, for example, Melissa Healy, Pentagon Details Ab11se of American POWs in Iraq; G11/f War: 
Brokm Bones, Tort11re, Sex11al Threats Are Reported. It Co11/d Sp11r F11rther Calls far War Crimes Trial, 
LA Times 1 (Aug 2, 1991); President George W. Bush, Address to the Nation (Mar 19, 
2003), available online at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030319-
17.html> (visited Sept 13, 2003) (condemning Iraqi use of human shields in the Second Gulf 
War); Judith Miller, War in the G111f: The Arabs; Neighbon"ng Allies 011traged by Iraqi Violence in 
Kiiwait, NY Times 8 (Feb 23, 1991) (discussing Arab reactions to the use of human shields in 
the First Gulf War). 
See C.B. Shotwell, Econo11ry and H11manity in the Use of Force: A Look at the Aerial Rules of 
Engagement in the 1991 G111f War, 4 USAF A] Legal Stud 15, 17-20 (1993) (citing numerous 
sources supporting the view that contrary to the conventional wisdom of the time, bombing 
of civilian populations during World War II did not break the morale of civilian 
communities, but rather strengthened their resolve to fight against their enemies). 
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reality also helps to buttress military morale, which is indelibly linked to the 
belief that the US cause and means of warfare are righteous.21 
Finally, good faith adherence to the LOAC is the right thing to do. The 
protection of innocent civilian life remains the fundamental principle behind the 
Geneva Conventions and, more broadly, the LOAC.22 The rule of law, and not 
just of men, remains one of the foundational distinctions between terrorism and 
tyranny on the one hand, and democracy on the other. 
III. CONTEXTUAL FACTORS FOR PRESIDENTIAL DECISION 
In light of the fundamental judgments identified above, the effective and 
lawful exercise of military command requires a measure of process for each 
context that meaningfully addresses each parameter. The extent to which the 
President should participate in such a process and approve targets should 
depend in turn on a variety of legal, policy, military, and personal factors. To be 
clear, by "approve," I mean the use of mechanisms of formal approval, such as a 
memorandum box checked or direct verbal assent. I also mean less formal 
processes of review before action is taken, such as the Secretary of Defense and 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff briefing the President on targets or battle 
plans, including target descriptions. In both cases, the President is rightly 
perceived as affirmatively assenting to the actions before they occur. 
A. LEGAL CONTEXT 
Clearly, the President should approve targets to the extent he is legally 
required to do so-a truism. This might be the case when a targeting decision 
itself constitutes the constitutional authorization to resort to force; for example, 
the 1986 aerial raid on Tripoli, or the 1998 strikes on a terrorist command 
meeting in Afghanistan and on the al-Shifa pharmaceutical plant in Sudan. 
Depending on one's theory of constitutional authority and one's view of the 
21 
22 
Maj. Gen. J.N. Mattis, US Marines Commanding General, 1st Division (REIN), Commanding 
General's Message to All Hands (Mar 2003) available online at <http:// 
www.usni.org/resources/Iraq/mattis_USMC_to_ all_hands.htm> (visited Oct 5, 2003). 
See Geoffrey Best, War and Law Since 1945 at 115-23, 253-66 (Clarendon 1994) (explaining 
how the protection of civilian life was a major international concern during the Geneva 
Conventions and "has become the driving concern of contemporary IHL development"); W. 
Michael Reisman and Chris T. Antoniou, eds, The Laws of War 80-93 (Vintage 1994) (citing 
numerous international laws governing the protection of civilians during wartime); Deparlment 
of the Amry Field Manual.· The Law ef Land Waifa!l1 3 (Department of the Army 1956) (noting 
that one of the three purposes of the "law of land warfare" is the protection of "both 
combatants and noncombatants from unnecessary suffering" and a second purpose is 
"[s]afeguarding certain fundamental human rights of persons who fall into the hands of the 
enemy, particularly prisoners of war, the wounded and sick, and civilians ... "); Maj. Lisa L. 
Turner and Maj. Lynn G. Norton, Civilians at the Tip of the Spear, 51 AF L Rev 1, 76-82 (2001) 
(explaining the provisions of the Geneva Conventions intended to protect civilians). 
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President's authority to delegate this authority, the nature of a target within an 
ongoing conflict (for example, across international boundaries) or method of 
engagement23 may sufficiently alter the legal context so as to warrant specific 
presidential approval. In addition, the President alone has the legal authority to 
change a concept of operations or timeline he has previously approved (unless, 
of course, he has provided a subordinate commander discretion to adjust as 
military circumstances dictate). The former circumstance appears to have been 
the case, for example, with the initial strike targeting Saddam Hussein on March 
19, which occurred outside the pre-planned sequence of military events.24 
Presidential authorization may also be limited in scope as a matter of policy 
discretion, with the President requiring the Secretary of Defense and combatant 
commanders to bring certain decisions to him not as a matter of law, but as a 
function of command. This was the case with respect to NATO's approval of a 
phased air campaign against Serbia.25 In addition, some uses of force will 
statutorily require presidential approval, such as activities that fall within the 
definition of covert action.26 
Presidential decision can also take on added legal valence in close cases 
where, as a matter of domestic law, the exercise of constitutional authority may 
serve as a lawful "tie-breaker" for a presidential decision in a manner unavailable 
to the Secretary of Defense or military commanders when they act pursuant to 
statutory or general delegated presidential authority alone. That is, the operation 
of US domestic law may not ultimately constrain the President's specific exercise 
of a core constitutional authority, so long as it is exercised in good faith. 
Moreover, where there are differences in legal view between allies regarding the 
application of the law-for example, opposing views on the lawful use of land 
mines or cluster bombs-decisions taken by the President are likely to receive 
greater deference from allies and afford military commanders greater protection 
from allegations of misconduct or war crimes for decisions taken in the field. 
B. POLICY CONTEXT 
Policy context should also dictate the degree to which the process of 
command includes presidential decision. Whether legally required or not, the 
President may establish policy "redlines," or boundaries delimiting permissible 
action in the absence of subsequent presidential decision. Such decisions may 
23 
24 
25 
26 
Regardless of one's constitutional views, it is unthinkable in a democracy that, absent 
presidential incapacitation, someone other than the President would or could authorize the 
use of nuclear weapons. 
Barton Gellman and Dana Priest, CIA Had Fix on Hussein; Intelligence &vealed 'Target of 
Opportunity," Wash Post A 1 (Mar 20, 2003). 
Baker, 55 Naval War Coll Rev at 16 (cited in note 13). 
50 USC§ 413(b) (2000). 
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include transitions from air to ground forces, increases in the risk of US or 
civilian casualties, trans-border operations, or operational matters that fall 
outside of what the President believes he has prepared the American public to 
expect and to sustain. 
The plural-lateral context27 may also warrant more rather than less 
presidential involvement. Where allies are hesitant or particularly cautious about 
targets, the President is more likely to review those targets that he may have to 
"sell" or defend to his counterparts. As became evident during the Kosovo 
campaign, a NA TO joint operation in Europe will involve a different process of 
combined consideration than will unilateral operations or operations conducted 
by ad hoc coalitions of the willing.28 
Decisionmakers today often have an array of equally lawful and effective 
options that can accomplish the immediate and direct military objective, but that 
offer very different policy outcomes, repercussions, and risks depending on how 
they are employed. For example, where today's military commander may order 
an attack on an electric grid to disable an air defense system, broader policy 
implications arise where technology enables the military to "turn off the lights" 
momentarily, permanently, or for some time in-between. In contrast, the aerial 
destruction of a city's power supply during World War II presumptively entailed 
an exercise in area bombing. In short, precision targeting options today 
introduce a new array of legal and policy considerations that extend beyond the 
immediate military objective of the strike. Questions of proportionality and 
necessity in turn may depend on analytic judgments about the impact of such 
actions on the enemy and long term effect on civilian populations. Therefore, 
civilian issues for decision are also raised. Within the military chain of command 
such target considerations warrant the consideration of the President and the 
Secretary of Defense. 
C. PRESIDENTIAL STYLE 
Process will also reflect the style and personality of the President and his 
senior staff as well as their views regarding the proper role of the President as 
Commander in Chief. The degree of presidential involvement will also reflect 
the level of confidence a President has in his military subordinates, and perhaps, 
his own confidence in his substantive and moral command over military affairs. 
This in turn will be informed by past performance and perceptions of 
performance. 
Presidential command is not new. President Lincoln hired and fired 
generals and read daily dispatches from the front across West Executive Avenue 
27 
28 
By which I mean, inter alia, bilateral arrangements, ad hoc coalitions of the willing, and more 
formal multilateral arrangements such as NATO. 
Baker, 55 Naval War Coll Rev at 16-21 (cited in note 13). 
Fall 2003 415 
Chicago Journal of International La11J 
in the War Department.29 However, changes in technology have changed the 
nature of command and the opportunities for presidential involvement. 
Napoleon's Grenadier Guards may have had marshals' batons in their 
rucksacks,30 but the US soldier today may have both a GPS indicator and a 
means of global communication. This increases the opportunities for national 
command and control over even the smallest maneuver elements or Special 
Forces spotter. 
Stories abound regarding the direct involvement of Presidents in military 
operations. President Ford directed air operations during the Mqyaguez crisis 
from the White House Situation Room, and at one point considered with his 
NSC principals whether a pilot on station in the Gulf of Cambodia should seek 
to disable the rudder of a fishing vessel carrying some of the Mqyaguez crew.31 
President Kennedy is understood to have personally directed US destroyers 
enforcing the quarantine during the Cuban Missile Crisis.32 Presidents Johnson 
and Carter were generally viewed as micro-managers, a term intended in both a 
descriptive and a pejorative sense.33 Indeed, whenever questions about 
presidential command arise, commentators often invoke images of President 
Johnson in his pajamas, pacing the White House basement, apparently paralyzed 
by doubt and uncertain in decision.34 That at least is the vision of Presidential 
command now ingrained in popular perception. 
But caution: Presidential perception is not always reality. President Clinton 
is purported to have approved "every [I<osovo] target" personally at the White 
House,35 a myth since repeated in wider circulation, notwithstanding the small 
number of persons who could actually know in what manner the President 
reviewed targets. In fact, President Clinton approved a subset of pre-planned 
targets.36 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
See David Herbert Donald, Lincoln 361, 389-92, 439 (Simon & Schuster 1995). 
"Every French soldier carries in his cartridge-pouch the baton of a marshal of France." John 
Daintith, et al, eds, The MacMillan Dictionary of Quotations 540 (MacMillan 1987), quoting 
Napoleon I. 
Ralph Wetterhahn, The Last Battle 97-99 (Carroll & Graf 2001). 
H.R. McMaster, Dereliction of Duty 31 (Harper Collins 1997); Graham T. Allison, Essence of 
Decision 127-28 (f.ittle, Brown 1971); Robert F. Kennedy, Thirteen Dqys 82 (Norton 1969). 
David L. Greene, With War under W qy, Bush Leaving Details to Advisers; Officials Note President 
Will Stqy in Touch during Weekend at Camp David, Baltimore Sun 7 A (Mar 22, 2003) (noting that 
"[s]ome historians have written of how Johnson, under enormous political pressure, 
immersed himself in Vietnam War field operations, sometimes choosing bombing targets."). 
Id ("Johnson was also known to walk in the middle of the night to the White House 
Situation room. There, in pajamas and slippers, he obtained the latest reports on bombing 
raids, casualties and missions in specific Vietnamese villages."). 
Gen. Wesley K. Clark, Waging Modem War: Bosnia, Kosovo, and the F11t11re of Combat 201-02 
(Public Affairs 2001). 
Baker, 55 Naval War Coll Rev at 18 (cited in note 13). 
416 VoL 4No. 2 
LBJ's Ghost: A Contextual Approach to Targeting Decisions and the Commander in Chief Baker 
Presidents and their staff may also seek to project a particular image of 
command at a time of national crisis for the benefit of public morale as well as 
for political consumption: hands-off to show confidence and calm (and perhaps 
hedge bets on outcome); or hands-on, to show presidential timber and authority. 
Presidential handlers, it seems, want to portray a President in command, but not 
meddling, someone less aloof perhaps than President Reagan, but above all not 
as engrossed as President Johnson, at least as these presidents are popularly 
. d 37 perceive . 
D. MILITARY CONTEXT 
There is no more important factor in determining presidential process than 
military context. Pre-planned and fixed targets permit more time for review than 
mobile targets and targets of opportunity. At the national level, targets of 
opportunity must be addressed by Rules of Engagement ("ROE''), class, or 
delegation of authority, and only in extraordinary circumstances on a case-by-
case basis. Likewise, for example, "dual use" targets in a city should entail a 
further degree of policy and legal review than military targets in the desert, not 
just because they often present more complex legal questions of proportionality, 
discrimination, and military objective, but because the policy consequences of 
US decisions are compounded. 
Aerial and land warfare also present different contexts and generally very 
different opportunities for civilian policy and legal review of targets. Air power is 
more susceptible to legal and policy adjustment than ground combat, in light of 
the variations in means and method of attack available through variation in 
munitions, delivery azimuth, angle of attack, aim point, fuse, and explosive, all 
amplified with the assistance of computer simulation. Infantry officers, in 
contrast, have fewer attack options, limited as they are by geography, the nature 
of indirect infantry weapons, and the nature of manoeuver warfare. 
Ground operations are also inherently more fluid than aerial operations 
against pre-planned or fixed targets. Even when aerial targets are emergent, there 
is often some time for command consideration as aircraft or weapons platforms 
move into position. In ground combat there are fewer fixed targets and 
emerging targets usually require immediate response. Thus, there is rarely 
opportunity for senior commanders, including the President, to apply law to 
emerging targets other than through overall frameworks of lawful decision. Put 
37 A more empirical index of presidential process is found in the number of National Security 
Council meetings a President attends during a crisis (including the functional equivalents 
such as "small group" meetings in the Oval Office). Where the Secretary of Defense and 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs attend, it would be unusual for the President not to review past 
military events as well as preview prospective operations, including pre-planned targets. 
Agendas and "summaries of conclusion" from these meetings would go even further in 
verifying the inclusion of military briefs and target package reviews. 
Fa/12003 417 
Chicago Journal eflntemational Law 
sharply, the NATO command structure, which ultimately succeeded during the 
Kosovo air campaign, would not function in an infantry environment where 
ground truth (or perceptions) and "immediate action" training dictate tactical 
choice and the margin between victory and defeat. Thus, vertical command 
structures where the President makes specific targeting decisions are most 
effective in a subset of military operations, including aerial operations and 
operations against pre-planned or fixed targets. 
E. APPRAISAL 
There is an apparent tension between security and speed, on the one hand, 
and a decision process requiring referral up the chain of command, on the other. 
In each context, decisionmakers must choose on a continuum between what is 
colloquially referred to as "horizontal" or "vertical" command. Where a vertical 
structure is adopted, decisionmakers must also specify those decisions capable of 
and intended for civilian command, which means the Secretary of Defense or 
the President. Where horizontal command is utilized, commanders must decide 
how far down the chain of command targeting decisions should be made. 
There are a number of advantages and disadvantages to presidential 
command. Presidential decision can enhance public support for military 
operations. In what is known as the "war bounce," the American public tends to 
rally to support the President in times of conflict. Moreover, the public is more 
likely to rally behind the President than a commanding general, unless of course 
such a general has assumed the popular stature of an Eisenhower or a 
Schwartzkopf. From a military perspective, the participation of the Commander 
in Chief can buffer the field commander from the spotlight of 24/7 media 
inspection by assuming or sharing the responsibility of decision in the same 
manner that athletic coaches may try to deflect unwanted attention from players. 
However, the corollary is also true. With presidential decision comes direct 
responsibility for result. 
From a legal policy perspective, vertical command also adds to consistency 
in the application of the LOAC. Where difficult targeting decisions are taken at 
the national level, the influence of military service branch culture and a combat 
arms perspective in determining legal result are less important. Personality (other 
than the President's) will also play less of a role in how the LOAC is interpreted 
and applied. The influence of a cautious military lawyer or an aggressive 
commander becomes less determinative when legal policy is set at the top. 
Most importantly, in a constitutional democracy, presidential decision and 
accountability should not be eschewed, but embraced as a fundamental tenet of 
what it means to have civilian command of the military instrument. Where 
Congress has not expressly authorized military action, the democratic legitimacy 
of US military operations arises from the President and ultimately his electoral 
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accountability to the people. Moreover, as noted above, it is with the President, 
and the President alone, that constitutional responsibility over military command 
and adherence to the law rest. 
Vertical command, in my view, also generally contributes to better 
decisions. First, as a bureaucratic observation, staff work tends to improve in 
rigor as it runs up the chain of decision. Second, a process culminating with the 
President is more likely to fuse multiple sources of information and perspective 
and do so in a timely manner. This is not important if the target is obvious (for 
example, a column of tanks). And it is less important in an ongoing conflict with 
military fronts and a Forward Edge of the Battle Area ("FEBA"). In such cases a 
commander's ROE should adequately set the intended policy, military, and legal 
parameters. But it is important if the target presents difficult factual, legal, or 
intelligence judgments like an al-Shifa. In these latter cases, additional 
perspective may distinguish the sound decision from the merely rapid decision. 
Similarly, some targets that may appear on the ground as raising purely 
tactical military considerations will nonetheless warrant policy consideration 
when viewed with wider perspective. For example, a decision whether to risk US 
forces to "secure" the Iraqi National Museum of Antiquities might well hinge on 
principles of force protection; however, the company or battalion commander 
on the spot is not well situated to balance the risk to his forces from pushing 
forward against the national policy consequences of not doing so.38 Such 
balancing requires broader considerations of policy intent and multi-dimensional 
risk assessment up the chain of command, preferably before the checkpoint is 
reached, but if necessary, afterwards. 
Presidential command is the fastest method I have observed for fusing 
disparate interagency information and views into an analytic process of decision. 
This is particularly important in a war on terror where pop-up targets will 
emerge for moments and strike decisions must be taken in difficult geopolitical 
contexts with imperfect information. The President is best situated to rapidly 
gather facts, obtain cabinet-level views, and decide. Vertical civilian command is 
38 In the days following the fall of Baghdad to allied forces, the military's failure to protect the 
Iraqi National Museum of Antiquities from looting became an issue of domestic and 
international debate. See, for example, Christopher Knight, A Cultural Casualty ef War,· The 
U.S. Military's Failure to Stop the Looting ef the Iraqi National Museum Was a Strategic Blunder, LA 
Times El (Apr 18, 2003). I offer this example because it illustrates well and in topical fashion 
the confluence of military and national policy considerations in tactical military decision; I do 
not offer the example in order to criticize or validate US decisions. I do note that the 
considerable loss of antiquities due to looting appears to have been initially exaggerated. See 
Christine Spolar, Most Museum Artifacts Found, Chi Trib 1 (May 5, 2003) (''The vast majority of 
antiquities feared stolen or broken have been found inside the National Museum in Baghdad, 
according to American investigators who compiled an inventory over the weekend of the 
ransacked galleries. A total of thirty-eight pieces, not tens of thousands, are now believed to 
be missing."). 
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less important, indeed potentially disruptive, where the military objective is set 
and the concept of operations calls for traditional and rapid maneuver warfare. 
Vertical command and fusion can also serve as a fail-safe where such 
process helps to channel target review into a routine and specialized process of 
review. Significantly, the erroneous bombing of the Chinese Embassy in 
Belgrade during the Kosovo campaign followed the identification and 
generation of a target outside the normal channel of target production. Although 
the presumptive target designated in briefs was indeed military in nature, human 
error placed the target at the wrong coordinates, even as the correct target was 
reviewed and approved by the chain of command. Although unusual, some 
targets that do not in fact pass a colorable test of military objective or 
discrimination, or in any event, do not conform with the President's view of 
such terms, may survive even a rigorous process of staff review. 
For sure, there are risks to vertical command. First, as the Long 
Commission demonstrated in the context of the Beirut bombing, vertical 
command, in that case involving eleven different layers between the President 
and the Battalion Landing Team commander, can diffuse responsibility and 
accountability in dangerous ways.39 Vertical command can take time and delay 
critical decision. However, in an age of global communication, Presidential 
decision need not cause undue delay where decisions flow directly from the 
President to the Secretary of Defense and are communicated to the combatant 
command (often by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff). 
Second, where combat operations are fluid, vertical target decision is 
inherently dysfunctional unless it is exercised through a commander's intent or 
ROE. This might be illustrated with reference to weaponized Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicle ("UAV") platforms that can be deployed both as point-to-point 
weapons (that is, launched with a specific coordinate in mind) or used to patrol 
for targets of opportunity. In the initial mode, vertical commanders can 
appropriately participate in a target decision where the target is pre-planned or 
fixed. In the latter case, the tactical setting will dictate that command discretion 
and the LOAC be applied through ROE or target-class approval, rather than an 
assessment of specific target circumstances at the time of attack. 
Third, for some observers, presidential command raises the specter that a 
civilian will make military decisions that they are not in fact trained to make. 
Again, the ghost of President Johnson selecting bombing targets in Vietnam 
lingers. Although some Presidents have had meaningful military and combat 
experience, few have had the necessary experience or training to determine how 
many divisions are required to secure supply lines for a three-division push to 
39 United States Department of Defense Commission, Report of the DoD Commission on Beimt 
Intemational Airport Terrorist Act, October 23, 1983 (Dec 20, 1983) (known as "The Long 
Commission Report"). 
420 Vol. 4No. 2 
LBJ's Ghost: A Contextual Approach to Targ,eting Decisions and the Commander in Chief Baker 
Baghdad. But this critique presumes that presidential decisions are made without 
military input. On the contrary, Presidential command, at least in modern times, 
appears to be uniformly the product of a military brief, and in targeting 
application, deferential to military input. 
In short, if not exercised with contextual forethought, presidential 
command can negate significant US military advantages that are emphasized 
with horizontal command. Horizontal command is rapid, and if pressed to the 
lowest tactical level, immediate. It emphasizes military expertise and 
professionalism, including a US leadership corps unmatched in training, ability, 
and independent thought, from combatant commander to small unit leader. And 
it emphasizes ground truth, with decisions taken on the basis of the observations 
by those with "eyes-on-target." 
Nonetheless, in my view, some pundits are too quick to disparage the value 
of vertical presidential command without acknowledging the possibility of its 
contextual and effective exercise in a manner that does not diminish US military 
advantage. The reality is that Presidents are briefed on military operations and 
that command decision at the level of the Commander in Chief can be taken, in 
the words of General Tommy Franks, on an "amazing time line."40 I have seen 
the most difficult and novel of military targets identified, briefed, considered, 
and decided by the President, with legal review by the Attorney General, in less 
than five minutes. It could be quicker if need be. Moreover, where it is not 
practicable to brief targets on a case-by-case basis, the President can, and should, 
exercise his constitutional command function through the review of theater 
ROE and concepts of operation. 
This view does not reflect a lack of faith in the fidelity and skill of the US 
military. Quite the opposite, it reflects the US military's commitment to 
constitutional government, challenged at times, but exemplified at the beginning 
by General Washington surrendering his commission to Congress and in the 
oath members of the Armed Forces take to "uphold and defend the 
Constitution." American citizen soldiers should act in combat with the 
confidence that their commander, and ultimately their interlocutor with the 
American public, stands behind their lawful actions. In a democracy, the buck 
should stop with the President and not with the lance corporal or even the 
Secretary of Defense. It is also at the level of the President and the Secretary of 
Defense, rather than at the level of the combatant commander, that the process 
of congressional consultation and briefing occurs. This, in turn, is an important 
element of constitutional process, democratic legitimacy, as well as a necessary 
step in building and sustaining public support for conflict. 
40 Gen. Tommy R. Franks, Briefing on Military Operations in Iraq (Mar 22, 2003), available online 
at <http://www.centcom.mil/CENTCOMNews/transcripts/20030322.htm> (visited Sept 
8, 2003). 
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Nor is this perspective, in the other direction, an expression of 
constitutional dogma or a sanguine faith in presidents and their lawyers. In my 
view, there are obvious decisions that are military in nature for military 
commanders alone to make. The majority of tactical and targeting decisions are 
in this category. However, there is also an obvious and smaller subset of 
decisions defined by the factors identified above that are Presidential in scope, 
and some that are contextually in-between, and we should not eschew a process 
that includes, and indeed encourages, presidential decision in these areas. A 
global war on terrorism, or a coalition war over Kosovo, will necessarily present 
a mix of different issues suggesting different processes of civilian command. The 
pilot must ultimately decide with the benefit of training and eyes on the target 
whether he can disable a rudder, but it is the President, not a unified commander 
like General Curtis LeMay or General Tommy Franks, who should ultimately 
determine whether and how a quarantine is enforced or a how a chemical attack 
with the potential consequence of nuclear confrontation may be deterred. 
In summary, I am not arguing for a fixed template of presidential decision 
but a contextual approach that accounts for a range of legal, policy, and military 
factors in deciding when and how Presidents should exercise command and, in 
doing so, apply the law. Such an approach recognizes that in a constitutional 
democracy, it is entirely appropriate for military decisions to be made by the 
President, and we should not avoid or obfuscate such a process, but celebrate 
and encourage its presence. I am not troubled that President Johnson dwelled 
on a war that would, for America, last over ten years and cost 58,000 American 
lives. I would expect that all Presidents would care as much. The image is only 
alarming if the President stifles advice, ignores better ideas in doing so, or if 
Presidential indecision hampers military effectiveness. Where the President does 
decide on targets, he should do so with the benefit not only of military input but 
also legal input. 
IV. THE PRESIDENT'S LEGAL COUNSEL 
Generals are sometimes accused of fighting the last war. Similarly, lawyers 
are sometimes accused of asserting black letter rules that might seem outdated or 
inchoate in a gray world. For sure, textual legal expression is, by its nature, 
frozen in time and requires interpretation. But the application of the law is 
consistently updated by taking account of current context. 
In the area of targeting, the LOAC regulates rather than prohibits force, 
seeks to minimize rather than preclude civilian casualties, and seeks to minimize 
human suffering. These critical legal policies are realized through the application 
of the principles of necessity, discrimination, proportionality, and military 
objective that are found in textual law and customary law. These are the 
principles to which commanders and lawyers return time and again. Clear 
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prohibitions, such as those prohibiting deliberate attacks on civilians or denying 
quarter, offer essential benchmarks. But absolutes do not always control as a 
matter of law in a world where terrorists use civilian airliners as missiles, and 
tyrants use civilians as human shields to protect weapons of mass destruction 
(''WMD"). Contextual principles applied in good faith do work in accomplishing 
the military mission and in protecting civilian society. Such principles adapt to 
wars against terrorism as well as fixed military fronts. And, such principles are 
capable of application by corporals, specialists, and Presidents. 
Michael Reisman has noted that if customary international law "has the 
advantage of applying to everyone," it also "has the disadvantage of often being 
hard to identify."41 This is a source of frustration and sometime tension for 
commanders, policymakers, and lawyers, whether they are applying customary 
international law from an operational or human rights perspective. This is 
especially so when the law is applied asymmetrically (as in the terrorism context) 
and therefore is perceived as being inchoate, because it constrains only one side. 
Likewise, the application of necessity, proportionality, and military objective at 
times is subject to imperfect definition and differing interpretation. As a result, 
the cases that tend to drive debate with respect to US actions often entail 
judgments involving the application of agreed upon principles to difficult facts, 
or that involve unintended errors in intelligence, equipment, munitions, or 
execution, but not in the legal framework applied or the result intended. There is 
also room for honest differences of view where the law is evolving based on 
customary practice. One function of the presidential lawyer is to identify the 
critical legal policies at issue and to ensure that their objectives are likely to be 
realized in a new context by an appropriate and lawful application of force. This 
requires a process of meaningful and timely legal input to decision. Discussion 
of legal process inevitably engages pre-existing notions of "lawyers," based on 
observation, experience, and myth. As issues of force deeply color perspectives 
on the validity and applicability of international law generally, specific 
experiences involving lawyers (or perhaps, accounts of lawyers) may unduly 
shape commanders' and policymakers' views as to whether lawyers should have 
a wartime role. "Process" to some is itself antithetical to the notion of military 
command. Throw in a lawyer to boot and you have a quagmire. As a result, not 
all commanders or policymakers welcome lawyers onto the military targeting 
team. This reluctance reflects innate and valid practices of secrecy, as well as 
concerns about delay and the possibility that the lawyer may say "no" to 
something the decisionmaker wants to do. 
My position is clear-the participation of lawyers in a military targeting 
process is indispensable as a matter of law. It also offers significant policy 
advantages in how the US articulates target decisions and establishes the legal 
41 Reisman and Antoniou, The Laws of War at xx (cited in note 22). 
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credibility of those decisions. This is true at the division level and it is true at the 
presidential level. If contextually designed to parallel the process of command, 
such legal input will be operationally effective, at least to the extent the exercise 
of operational command is itself effective. Intuitively, the answer is for lawyers 
to address concerns about speed by limiting participants to the essential few and 
meeting real world deadlines, not for commanders to omit lawyers from the 
decision cycle. This means a Judge Advocate in the field and/or a Unified Staff 
Judge Advocate, the DoD General Counsel (and/or Joint Chiefs of Staff/Legal 
Counsel), and a presidential lawyer, depending on the level of command 
decision. 
The role of the military lawyer is well described elsewhere, including in this 
volume. The role of the President's legal counsel is less well understood and 
certainly not defined by acknowledged practice or doctrine. In my view, the 
President's legal counsel has three essential tasks: education, review, and 
appraisal. 
A. EDUCATION 
Lawyers and policymakers need to train for war, albeit intellectually, and 
not with the physical risk embedded in military training. When Daniel Webster 
transcribed his most famous statement about self-defense in the context of the 
Caroline incident, he did so four years after the precipitating event.42 Today's 
national security lawyer does not have such time for deliberation. For a variety 
of reasons relating to the nature and multiplicity of transnational and state 
threats, combined with the devastating potential of WMD, questions of whether 
to resort to force and the methods and means of force will pop-up and require 
immediate decision. Decisionmakers may have to assess an option in a night, or 
in a tactical moment, and immediately explain the action to the American public 
and the world for all times' sake. 
That means the President and his legal counsel will come to the decision 
table as they are. Therefore, they must already know the LOAC relevant to their 
level of command as well as the foundational judgments that underpin the 
LOAC. This puts a premium on furnishing necessary background in advance of 
crisis, a tall order for any president's legal counsel competing for the president's 
time and attention, but it must be done. A President is simply not going to stand 
by for a lecture on Grotius at a time of crisis. Instead, he will recall Cicero. 
Moreover, clients are more likely to absorb principles that constrain, as well as 
that permit, in the calm before crisis than they are in the heat of the decision 
moment. That means the framework for lawful decision must already be 
42 See letter from Daniel Webster to Mr. Fox April 24, 1841, reprinted in 1 The Papers of Daniel 
Webster, Diplomatic Paper 1841-43 (New England 1983). 
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embedded in decisionmaking checklists, or at least that portion of the checklist 
that includes counsel in the decision cycle. 
Advance guidance on the LOAC also helps establish lines of 
communication and a common vocabulary of nuance between lawyer and client. 
Any policymaker who receives such a brief will be sure his or her lawyer fully 
participates in the targeting process at that level of command. In addition, the 
policymaker will understand in a live situation that the lawyer is applying 
"operational law" and not kibitzing on operational matters. 
At the same time, the presidential lawyer must understand the strengths 
and limitations of the intelligence process that informs command and legal 
judgments as well as the evolving nature of military operations, and thus the 
evolving application of law. By example, the advent and increasing prevalence of 
precision weapons in the US arsenal has led to unrealistic expectations that 
armed conflict, at least on the part of the United States, can be conducted with 
few or even no collateral casualties.43 This is a worthy objective, and one that I 
am confident the United States Government embraces, not just because it 
reflects the intent of the LOAC and is morally sound, but, for hard realists, 
because it is also good policy. The aerial weapons of today's United States 
arsenal permit extraordinary and precise adjustments in aim point, angle of 
attack, and azimuth of attack as well as different variants in fuse and explosive. 
Combined with detailed and rapid computer models, which can project blast 
effects, and a professional cadre of "targeteers," the US capability to maximize 
discrimination and minimize civilian casualties is remarkable, and easily 
unmatched in history. But a few words of caution are needed. 
Precision weapons do not lift the fog of war, and lawyers should not 
confuse "precision weapon" with "precision decision." They do not address 
questions of perfidy and ruse, human and technical errors, or limitations in 
intelligence. And they do not address technical or logistical capabilities. Precision 
weapons are simply not the right choice for every strategic or tactical scenario 
and may not be "on station" in every tactical situation. 
Further, because many precision weapons are either unmanned or capable 
of effective launch from afar, or both, some may perceive that the United States 
43 See, for example, Human Rights Watch, Civilian Deaths in NATO Air Campaign, Summary 
(Feb 2000), available online at <www.hrw.org/reports/2000/nato> (visited Sept 13, 2003) 
(implying that large numbers of civilian deaths resulted from questionable targeting and 
munition decisions); Human Rights Watch, New Figures on Civilian Death in Kosovo War (Feb 7, 
2000), available online at <www.hrw.org/press/2000/02/nato207.htm> (visited Sept 13, 
2003) (alleging that "[a]ll too often, NATO targeting subjected the civilian population to 
unacceptable risks" and suggesting that illegitimate targeting and munition decisions resulted 
in large numbers of civilian deaths). 
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is not taking "all reasonable measures"44 to prevent collateral casualties when its 
pilots do not break a certain ceiling or enter the airspace of the country affected 
in order to launch the weapon. Caution is warranted here as well. "Eyes on" can 
make the difference in distinguishing between a column of buses with refugees 
and one with combatants. But, pilot "eyes on" will not necessarily change the 
quality of intelligence, if, for example, the target is a building. Moreover, 
discrimination is not measured by the equivalence between civilian and military 
casualties, but by the minimization of civilian casualties. Precision aerial weapons 
accomplish that end. Further, increased pilot risk often means an increase in 
civilian risk as well. This is certainly the case where helicopters are employed in 
lieu of precision weapons and area suppression munitions are used to prep the 
area of helicopter operations. Further, regardless of platform, if pilots are shot 
down, ground troops will follow. And ground combat is usually more 
destructive and indiscriminate to civilians than aerial attack with precision 
weapons. 
For these reasons, the law should encourage states to develop, invest in, 
and use precision weapons, and lawyers should consider with care the adoption 
of absolutes that might negate the advantages to the combatant from using 
precision weapons, the use of which upholds the fundamental tenets of the 
LOAC by improving the ability to discriminate between military and civilian 
targets. 
B. TARGET REVIEW AND ARTICULATION 
The president's legal counsel should perform at least two target functions 
for the President. First, he should provide independent guidance on the 
application of the law within the framework of an established client relationship. 
He does this by clearly and quickly concurring on memos, by e-mail, or orally. 
For that small subset of more difficult targets, he should explain how principles 
apply in context and document the analysis for the record. As a matter of legal 
policy, he should identify relevant precedent so that the President will 
understand where on a historical continuum of practice his decision will fall and 
how it may shape the law, reciprocal conduct, and perceptions of US views of 
the law. 
Where necessary, legal counsel must be prepared to say no. However, in 
the American context there are few targeting proposals that will reach the 
President that should prompt absolute LOAC prohibitions. Most decisions 
involve judgment calls regarding the application of law to facts, or intelligence 
and analytic judgments regarding facts and projected outcomes. Nonetheless, 
44 See Additional Protocol I art 57, § 4 (cited in note 18); see also Annotated Supplement to the 
Commander's Handbook on the Liw of Naval Operations ch 8.1 (cited in note 18) (requiring "all 
reasonable precautions"). 
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because targets will be added, dropped, and adjusted by the President (or in his 
presence) immediate legal consideration is required. So too, targets of 
opportunity will be brought directly to the President as time or secrecy dictate, 
as was the case with Saddam Hussein's command bunkers during Operation 
IRAQI FREEDOM. As a matter of timing and culture, it is hard enough for the 
military lawyer to advise commanders on the LOAC ahead of decision; it is 
entirely unrealistic for the military lawyer to take issue with a target already 
approved by the President. Therefore, the law must be weighed in conjunction 
with the President's decision and that requires a presidential lawyer. 
Of course, with the President, the roles of client and lawyer merge. In his 
capacity as chief executive and with his duty to "take Care that the Laws be 
faithfully executed"45 the President is not just Commander in Chief, but Counsel 
in Chief. However, the President who hopes to exercise both his command and 
legal role at once could find that "he has a fool for a client." Application of the 
LOAC requires role-playing. My own observation, and certainly the sense 
garnered from presidential papers and pronouncements, is that no burden 
weighs more heavily on the President than his responsibility to protect American 
lives. Such a duty should compel the President to press his advisors and his 
lawyers as far as he can to accomplish this end, now more than ever where the 
nuclear age walks parallel to the age of terrorism. With the President's 
preeminent responsibility thus defined, a President who is also serious about the 
rule of law, including the application of the law of armed conflict, should seek 
dispassionate legal advice from a person dedicated to this role. At the level of 
the President, this has the added advantage of ensuring that the Commander in 
Chiefs view of the law is applied to national-level decisions. Moreover, in most 
contexts, this will be the only legal view expressed from outside the Department 
of Defense. Furthermore, decisions taken without such legal participation may 
be perceived as, and in fact be, less credible where legal issues are raised. 
Role-playing, as in other substantive areas, also entails fact testing. Such a 
role is all the more critical where timelines are short and process may be 
truncated. Are all relevant facts and analytic conclusions on the table? Are there 
seams of factual disagreement between agencies that advocates for action or 
inaction have glossed over or omitted? Although these are not inherently legal 
questions, the dispassionate lawyer, trained to review fact and argument, can play 
a critical role in presidential process. 
C. APPRAISAL 
The President's counsel must also consider the immediate and enduring 
legal consequences of the President's decisions. How will the target be 
45 US Const art II, § 3. 
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explained? What information is available to do so? Will other states, and non-
state actors, assert a reciprocal right of action? If so, what impact will this have 
on US national security and to international public order? 
Policy articulation is ultimately the business of policymakers and their 
speechwriters and press secretaries, not lawyers. The language of law does not 
always pack the punch or clarity of policy prose. Policymakers "retaliate," 
lawyers "respond." "Shock and awe" are not words lawyers would immediately 
use to describe necessary and proportionate action. Even where a sound 
presidential decision is taken, if it is not well explained, in terms of factual 
predicate or legal foundation, tactical and military victory can turn to political 
defeat. The President's legal counsel can play an important role in influencing 
how US targeting decisions are explained and therefore perceived, particularly 
when so much policy articulation for US military action occurs at the 
presidential or cabinet level. 
Al-Shifa illustrates the point. Contradictions in statements, as well as 
statements that seemed to inflate facts, distracted and obscured public focus 
from the essential national security underpinning of the President's decision: Al-
Shifa was a pharmaceutical plant that the Director of Central Intelligence 
determined was linked to both chemical weapons precursors and to Osama bin 
Laden. After the August 1998 embassy bombings the President had no doubt of 
al Qaeda's intent to attack the United States by whatever means possible. 
In my experience, the United States does a better job at incorporating 
intelligence into its targeting decisions than it does in using intelligence to 
explain those decisions after the fact. This in part reflects the inherent difficulty 
in articulating a basis for targets derived from ongoing intelligence sources and 
methods. Moreover, it is hard to pause during ongoing operations to work 
through issues of disclosure. Commanders should look forward and not behind. 
But articulation is an important part of the targeting process that must be 
incorporated into the decision cycle for that subset of targets raising the hardest 
issues, for example, where the purpose may not be apparent from information 
available to the public, or the civilian casualties are high in relation to the military 
advantage apparent to the public. 
Whatever the role of the President's legal counsel generally, he or she bears 
a special responsibility to ensure that when the President speaks, or his 
immediate advisors speak, they do so conscious of the legal and legal policy 
implications of their words. Where the President speaks the message is 
magnified and the consequences usually irreversible. 
As part of the appraisal function, the President's legal counsel also bears 
responsibility to ensure that ongoing operations are conducted in a manner 
consistent with presidential direction and that presidential orders do not have 
unintended or ill-founded effect. Do the ROE work? Has presidential process 
delayed decision, or put servicemen at risk? If so, is such process well founded? 
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Second, where the President has provided limited or nuanced authorization, 
have circumstances changed? In the case of a campaign conducted with 
embedded journalists reporting 24/7, the answers may be self-evident without 
need for inquiry. But where clandestine counter-terrorist operations are 
involved, or serial conflicts outside the public eye-for example, the Iraq No Fly 
Zones (1991-2003) or Somalia-such questions become more relevant, if not 
urgent. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Targeting process is usually considered from the perspective of military 
efficiencies. In my view, such processes should also be evaluated from the 
perspective of constitutional imperatives and legal efficiencies. Neither 
perspective need be exclusive of the other. 
The advantages of horizontal command are apparent. The advantages of 
presidential command are less apparent, but more enduring in a constitutional 
democracy founded on the principle of law. In context, there are good 
arguments for vertical civilian decision, and in particular presidential approval. 
Such approval may be required as a matter of law, for example, when the target 
itself requires the constitutional authorization to resort to force. As a matter of 
legal policy, the President should also approve targets (or classes of target, etc.) 
that cross new boundaries-in territory, weapon choice, collateral casualty, and 
risk. 
Moreover, from presidential decision comes enhanced political and legal 
legitimacy. Presidential decision, on the close calls, results in consistency in 
application of targeting principles. For the military, this brings public recognition 
that in democracy the military implements rather than makes policy, and 
therefore should be supported for its professionalism and not on the basis of its 
policy choices. 
Although decision in the field is generally faster, presidential decision can 
also create military efficiencies. This is the case where targets based on uncertain 
information emerge, requiring difficult and timely choices based on the 
immediate collection and review of national level intelligence judgments from 
multiple agencies. The President is best situated legally and bureaucratically to 
fuse this information and make a decision in a timely manner. As a matter of 
constitutional law and process, the President is also best situated to determine 
what information, if any, will be disclosed in order to articulate the basis for 
difficult decisions. These are problems that have arisen and will continue to arise 
in a global war on terrorism. 
To be clear, the President may, and appropriately does, delegate his 
command and legal responsibilities in a majority of contexts. Presidential 
targeting decisions will be primarily focused on pre-planned or emerging aerial 
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targets and less so on emerging infantry targets. Thus, presidential targeting 
approval should apply to on/y a small subset of targets. Decisionmakers should ask: 
Is this something the President needs to approve? If not, what are the military 
and policy consequences of doing so? Military officers within the chain of 
command should ask not only if this is a target or decision that must go to the 
President, but also whether it should go to the President. The question is not 
can it be done, but should it be done based on the policy, legal, and military 
factors at play. Decision is rapid when it is framed contextually (that is, target, 
class, or ROE) and decisionmakers are trained in temperament and the 
substantive issues relative to the decision. 
When the President decides, he should do so with the benefit of counsel. 
Why? Because the President's primary role in national security is making policy 
decisions. His focus is rightly on the cost and benefits of the options presented. 
At the same time, the President bears direct and ultimate responsibility under the 
Constitution to uphold the law and, as Commander in Chief, this includes the 
LOAC. The President's counsel, then, guides by educating the commander, 
testing facts, and offering contextual applications of principles. During the 
articulation phase of a decision, the lawyer also serves as an advocate. Only 
rarely should the lawyer serve as judge, but the President's legal counsel must be 
prepared to assume all three roles. 
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